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Abstract
Having initially welcomed more than a million refugees and forced migrants into Europe between 2015 
and 2016, the European Union’s (EU’s) policy has shifted toward externalising migration control to Turkey 
and Northern Africa. This goes against the spirit of international conventions aiming to protect vulnerable 
populations, yet there is widespread indifference toward those who remain stranded in Italy, Greece and 
bordering Mediterranean countries. Yet there are tens of thousands living in overcrowded reception facilities 
that have, in effect, turned into long-term detention centres with poor health and safety for those awaiting 
resettlement or asylum decisions. Disregard for humanitarian principles is predicated on radical inequality 
between lives that are worth living and protecting, and unworthy deaths that are unseen and unmarked by 
grieving. However, migration is on the rise due to natural and man-made disasters, and is becoming a global 
issue that concerns us all. We must therefore deal with it through collective political action that recognises 
refugees’ and forced migrants’ right to protection and ensures access to the health services they require.
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Introduction
In 2015, more than a million refugees and forced migrants, 
including children, women and men, crossed into the 
European Union (EU) by land and sea.1 Fleeing from war and 
persecution, the early waves of people arriving on the shores 
of the Mediterranean attracted the sympathy of receiving 
societies in various EU countries. Local communities in 
Greece and Italy, hand-in-hand with networks of volunteers 
from around the world, responded to their urgent needs, 
including health and safety,2,3 and many others helped them on 
their way to Germany and Sweden.4,5 Yet the initial welcome, 
epitomised in German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s statement 
“we can do it,”6 was quickly replaced by rising hostility toward 
the refugees and would-be migrants. Only a few months later, 
the Chancellor revised her policy, reaching an agreement 
with Turkey on behalf of the EU to hold back the arrivals in 
exchange for billions of Euros, free travel visas for its citizens, 
and a commitment from the EU to take the equivalent 
number of people directly from Turkish refugee camps.7 This 
marked an important shift toward securitisation, involving 
extreme politicisation of migration and its presentation as 
a security threat.8 Security policies are closely interwoven 
and entangled with humanitarian policies and transnational 
attempts to stabilise and enforce a specific, highly restrictive 
asylum system.9 This, I argue, signifies a departure from the 
principles of universal humanitarianism developed in Europe 
after the Second World War,10 and has led to a politically 
ambiguous and deeply paradoxical humanitarianism11 driven 
by limited moral considerations unsuited to addressing the 
impending increase in migration.12
Public debates and academic research centre around 
the actual or alleged impact of the incoming populations 
on their host societies’ economies, as well as on social and 
political development. Much less attention is being given to 
how the arriving refugees and forced migrants are coping 
with the trauma of the dramatic events that led to their flight, 
and with the aftermath of the traumatic journeys in which 
tens of thousands have lost their lives.12 There is insufficient 
recognition of the health needs of migrants, forced refugees 
and asylum seekers as a structural part of society, rather 
than as ‘external’ to health systems and other areas.13 The 
anti-migration rhetoric is becoming a permanent fixture of 
European politics,14,15 even though the mass arrival of more 
than 1.3 million people into the EU by sea in 2015 and 201616 
reduced dramatically to 120 000 in 2017 and to just over 60 000 
in the first six months of 2018.17 In addition to the perception 
of refugees and migrants as threats to the economy and 
security, anxiety is often attributed to concerns surrounding 
globalisation and multiculturalism.18 However, anti-
migration sentiments may be a form of anxiety displacement 
arising from the dislocation experienced by citizens of 
many developed European countries in economies with 
decreasing opportunities for meaningful employment and an 
increasingly privatised welfare state.15 In the aftermath of the 
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global financial crisis, this dislocation has been exacerbated 
by retrenchment of the welfare state following the neoliberal 
shift in public policy over the past few decades. This is best 
reflected in the case of Greece, as the gateway to Europe in the 
recent refugee crisis, as well as in bordering Mediterranean 
countries such as Italy that receive refugees.
Refugee Crisis or Refugees in Crisis?
Tens of thousands of people are currently in Greece, living in 
difficult conditions as they await resettlement, repatriation/
deportation or asylum decisions.19 Many are living in 
overcrowded former military camps, abandoned factories 
and other disused public buildings such as summer camps 
and orphanages, with inadequate facilities to host them, and 
often without health and social services to meet even their 
basic needs. Addressing the health and housing needs of 
these people at short notice would have been financially and 
logistically challenging for any country20; but Greece’s own 
problems exacerbate these difficulties, as it is experiencing 
the longest and deepest recorded economic depression 
during peacetime.21 Its cash-starved public health system 
and bankrupt social security22 are unable to deal with its 
own citizens’ increasing needs, let alone those of the migrant 
populations now held in reception facilities (hot-spots) 
directed by the police and military in various mainland 
and island locations. Unlike Italy,23 Greece has had little 
experience of receiving and integrating refugees from diverse 
cultures.22,24 Even in Italy, “the reception system for asylum 
seekers and refugees, expanding to reach just over 180 000 
places as of December 31, 2017, continues to be based, for 
the most part, on extraordinary reception structures in which 
services aimed at social inclusion are limited.”25 
Refugees and forced migrants hope to rebuild their lives, 
but not necessarily in Greece or Italy given these countries’ 
domestic problems. For instance, Greece has a 23% overall 
unemployment rate, and youth unemployment reaching 
almost 50%,26 while many citizens in Italy are as marginalised 
as their migrant neighbours, living in informal settlements 
and engaging in informal occupations.25 Yet the refugees’ 
and forced migrants’ onward journeys to Northern European 
countries in search of a better future are made more haphazard 
and uncertain by current EU policies. Most refugees and 
migrants find themselves in legal limbo, subsisting in sub-
human27 conditions in hot-spots in the Mediterranean that are, 
in effect, detention camps, with insufficient medical support28 
and restricted movement (for instance, in Greece they are not 
allowed to leave the islands). Even reuniting with their families 
is fraught with increasing difficulty. Feeling desperate about 
being separated, people are often willing to put their lives in 
the hands of smuggler networks to reunite with their families 
across different countries, or even within the same country.29 
Taken together, these factors exert extreme psychological 
pressure, putting people at increased risk of mental health 
breakdown19,27 and various psychosocial diseases. A recent 
study of 1293 refugees and forced migrants in three reception 
facilities in Greece found that most considered their access to 
legal information and assistance with asylum procedures to be 
poor to non-existent, and their uncertain status exacerbated 
their anxiety.19 Their various mental illness are caused mainly 
by external factors rather than by any prior mental health 
disorder.27 Overall, the newcomers’ health problems arise 
both from traumatic events in their own countries and the 
privations of their journeys, and from poor living conditions 
since their arrival, despite efforts by the Greek government 
to address cases of extreme vulnerability through emergency 
legislation and financial and logistical assistance from the EU. 
For instance, a list of people belonging to vulnerable groups 
is set out in relevant national legislation (see Box 1), giving 
them preference for accommodation outside camps with 
inadequate water supplies and poor sanitation, which offer no 
privacy or safety in overcrowded facilities.
This policy suggests that people with legally-defined 
vulnerabilities should be prioritised. However, such logic 
might be at odds with securing universal healthcare for all 
who need it that derives from a rights-based approach, as 
stipulated by the World Health Organization.13 In Greece 
and Sicily, entry points for arrivals into Europe, medical care 
provision varies significantly from one centre to another, 
with uneven access where it does exist. This is because many 
reception facilities are in out-of-town locations, and hot-spot 
managers lack information on services available.23,24 Access 
to the psychological help that many desperately require is 
even more scarce.27 Contrary to false alarms about the alleged 
health risk posed by refugees to receiving societies, it is they 
who face many risks to their health and wellbeing, as well 
their dignity. Legally-defined vulnerability based on different 
categories of need may therefore have the unintentional effect 
of promoting a new, restricted version of humanitarianism. 
Overall, such measures do not address refugees’ and forced 
migrants’ essential problems, and fail to ensure that these 
people have liveable lives and futures.30 For instance, even 
though the right to family life and protection of the family 
is enshrined in international human rights law, and is a 
shared value across cultures, the vulnerability policy forces 
families to continue to live apart after being separated during 
displacement, exposing them to the associated risks.29 The 
EU and its member states are failing to protect this right 
for refugees and migrants, as their policies and practices 
tear families apart. The challenges experienced by refugees 
and forced migrants at the EU frontier in Greece and Italy, 
including unsanitary and unsafe conditions often without 
healthcare, shelter, food and water,25,27,28 exemplify the need for 
collective solutions based on principles of universality rather 
According to Article 14(8) of Greek law L 4375/2016, vulnerable 
groups are: (a) unaccompanied minors, (b) people who have a 
disability or are suffering from an incurable or serious illness, 
(c) the elderly, (d) women in pregnancy or having recently given 
birth, (e) single parents with minor children, (f) victims of torture, 
rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual 
violence or exploitation, and people with a post-traumatic disorder, 
particularly survivors and relatives of victims of shipwrecks, and 
(g) victims of trafficking in human beings.27,29
Box 1. Greek Law Offering Protection to the Vulnerable Refugees, 
Forced Migrants and Asylum Seekers
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than short-lived displays of solidarity through voluntary 
efforts.
The Value and Values of Humanitarianism Re-envisioned?
The fate of refugees and forced migrants is now met 
mainly with indifference, or even enmity, even though the 
current numbers of people arriving into Europe hardly 
constitute a “migratory” or “refugee” crisis. This is not 
new: the dispossessed and refugees of the past often met 
with indifference and rejection by those who might help.31 
Researchers have identified a range of social and individual 
factors, including public policies, discourses propagated by 
politicians and the media as well as prosocial orientation, that 
may facilitate or impede our willingness to receive refugees and 
migrants into our societies.18 Underlying these are complex 
psychosocial processes of categorising belonging and who 
counts as an outsider. These do not necessarily or exclusively 
involve rational evaluations and calculative thinking, but are 
often driven by unconscious fears and affective dynamics that 
are central to defining both who deserves help, and the level 
of help that individuals are willing to provide to them.15
International humanitarian law, enshrined in the 1951 
Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol,32 sets out ratifying 
states’ obligations to protect refugees (civilian victims of 
war and armed conflict), with the intention of overcoming 
the randomness and unpredictability of such provision. 
Seeking to establish universal principles and values worth 
protecting in shielding refugees from harm aims to prevent 
situations where stateless people become, in Arendt’s words, 
“rightless”33 and are therefore exposed to every arbitrariness 
imaginable. I also suggest that the Convention recognises our 
universally-shared vulnerability and capacity for suffering, 
without instituting moral hierarchies or distinctions. This 
shift to humanitarianism originating in a rights-based 
approach is a recent invention with origins in medical 
ethics.13 Humanitarian medical providers, such as the Red 
Cross and Médecins sans Frontières, are playing an important 
role in this transformation. However, although protecting 
universal human values is now a potent force in our world,11 
this situation may change. As philosopher Giorgio Agamben34 
cautions, “the refugee is the sole category in which it is 
possible today to perceive the forms and limits of a political 
community to come.”
Arguably, the EU–Turkey deal exemplifies the potential 
directions and implications of such developments. This 
agreement7 may be in breach of the Geneva Convention’s 
non-refoulment rule (the forcible return of refugees or asylum 
seekers to countries where they are liable to be subjected 
to persecution), as Turkey falls short of the criteria for a 
safe first country in which asylum concepts can be applied. 
Human rights organisations report repeated shootings of 
Syrian refugees fleeing war at the Turkish border.35,36 As an 
article in Der Spiegel notes, fewer people are now drowning 
in the Aegean, as the number of boat crossings to Greece has 
decreased since the signing of the agreement; instead, refugees 
are now dying at the Turkish–Syrian border.37 In 390 of the 393 
decisions issued by the Greek Appeals Committees concerning 
the repatriation/deportation of refugees and forced migrants, 
the requirements of national and EU law to consider Turkey a 
safe third country have not been fulfilled.38 Although Turkish 
citizens are not allowed to travel freely in the EU and relatively 
few migrants have been returned to or taken out of Turkey, 
there is little interest in the fate of the almost 60 000 people 
who have been left stranded in Greece following the EU–
Turkey deal. European countries are turning their backs on 
their international obligations, as expressed in the EU’s recent 
policy of “externalising” migration controls to Turkey and 
Northern Africa, and there is evidence of the EU and member 
states targeting and criminalising defenders of the rights of 
people on the move.39 If continued, these changes may signal 
a move toward a new form of biopolitics, whereby worthy 
lives and suffering are made visible, while unworthy deaths 
are unseen and unmarked by grieving.30 Such biopolitics are 
predicated on the idea of radical inequality between sacred 
life on the one hand (eg, Western soldiers) and sacrificed life 
on the other (eg, local civilians).40
These developments call into question the principle of a 
universal, inalienable right to protection at a fundamental level, 
reinforcing the call for individual action in the face of states’ 
ostensible neglect but with no impetus for political change.41 
Relying on individual and/or voluntary efforts may thus 
promote a type of humanitarianism that does not consider the 
causes of dispossession, but merely aims to build a temporary 
illusion of bridging the contradictions that give rise to global 
inequalities, and to “make the intolerableness of its injustices 
somewhat bearable” (p. xii).11 Yet humanitarianism, which 
focuses first and foremost on individual suffering, need not be 
incompatible with politics.42,43 Compassion and ethics of care 
are essential components of individual and social life, while 
both affect and care are political, as they are concerned with 
how we share this world with others.44 Migration is on the rise 
due to natural and man-made disasters that will become the 
defining problem of the 21st century.12 It requires collective 
political action as it concerns us all. We cannot address it 
effectively by reducing our acceptance of refugees and forced 
migrants or ignoring their essential health and welfare needs. 
Instead we must protect human rights by attaching equal value 
to all lives within and beyond the borders of nation states 
whenever their survival is at risk. In offering such protection, 
we recognise our dependence on others for our own survival 
as individuals and social beings.
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